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ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION: 14(b) 
The Court has requested special briefing on the issue of 
the impact of this Court's decision in LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. 
805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991) on this case vis-a-vis the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Utah in Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Bros. Const. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) , regarding the issue of 
lease versus security agreement. | 
The Court has also requested that Appellants respond to 
the offer of compromise made by Appellee Overland in oral argument 
regarding crediting Appellants with one half of the $51,864.90 
total from the Trustee's Sale of Appellants' property. In response 
to the offer of compromise made at this late stage, for the reasons 
stated herein, Appellants hereby reject said offer• 
Addressing the applicability of Conlin, Appellants 
contend here, as expressed in their reply brief, that it makes no 
difference whether the lease agreement is construed as a lease or 
security agreement because Appellee is bound for its recovery on 
I 
the contractual provision for liquidated damages which reasonably 
interpreted and construed, establishes a penalty and will not be 
enforced under familiar rules that are uniformly applied in such 
circumstances. , 
The affidavit submitted by Appellee Overland to establish 
damages, although nicely drawn, was not in conformity with the 
liquidated damages provision of the lease agreement and was 
therefore legally inadequate where Appellants did not offer any 
affidavits in opposition, assuming that Appellee Overland is bound 
by the contractual provisions of the agreement between the parties. 
In Conlin, 805 P.2d at 196, this Court specified those 
factors it considers significant. First, the Court stated, "'The 
prime essential distinction between a lease and a conditional sale 
is that in a lease the lessee never owns the property.1" That is 
not the case here in light of the option to purchase contained in 
the lease agreement. In Conlin, the lease contained no such option 
to purchase. Second, this Court stated in Conlin that "[t]he 
agreement specifically provides for retention of title [in the 
lessor] ..." Id. In the instant action, the lease contains an 
option to purchase "which is an alternative provision for transfer 
of ownership." Id. This Court then added that "ownership tax 
benefits under the lease agreement, another traditional indication* 
that the parties intended to enter into a true lease agreement" 
were reserved exclusively to the lessor in Conlin. Id. In this 
action, ownership tax benefits, as indicated by the record, were 
in favor of the lessee, the Appellants. 
Factors such as the option to purchase and the ownership 
tax benefits, in addition to the numerous factors listed in 
Colonial Leasing Co. , 731 P.2d at 487, which are present in this 
lease and were enumerated during oral argument, indicate genuine 
issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary 
judgment. 
In Colonial Leasing Co., the lower court held that parol 
evidence was not admissible to change the character of the lease 
agreement. It is Appellants' understanding of the holding of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. that the presence of 
certain provisions in the putative lease agreement that are 
commonly associated with and contained in purchase agreements 
create ambiguities and the necessity for the admission of extrinsic 
or parol evidence to clear up. The case was remanded so the trial 
court could allow parol evidence to clear up the ambiguity that was 
created by the presence of provisions that are normally associated 
with purchase agreements. See, Colonial Leasing Co., 731 P.2d at 
488. 
In the instant action, there is only one conclusion 
reasonably inferable from the provisions of the documents (the 
lease agreement and the trust deed), i.e., the transaction is a 
sale agreement. If, as Appellee Overland contends, the agreement 
is a true lease, then why the requirement for additional security 
in the form of the trust deed on Appellants1 residence. The 
security in the form of the trust deed, along with the equipment 
described in the lease, are labeled as "security" for payment of 
the installment payments described in the lease. 
But then, as previously stated, whether the character of 
the transaction is determined to be a lease or a sale, the Appellee 
Overland cannot recover under the liquidated damages provision 
because that would be a penalty. 
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is not 
appropriate in this case, and this Court should reverse the lower 
court's granting of summary judgment. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 1991. 
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES 
David W. Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ON APPLICABILITY OF LMV LEASING INC. V. CONLIN 
was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 27th day of June, 1991 to the 
following: 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741) 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025) 
Robert L. Payne, Esq. (5129) 
kLLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State Street #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Joseph T. Dunbeck (3645) 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
L*Z Kathy 
UTAH ^ ^ 
DOCUMENT ^_ 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO 
Craig G. Adamson(0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870)
 M rv T Noob*n 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant " ' 1 
310 South Main Street, suite 1330 W 8 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOOO 
Utati Cuu. 
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case NO. 90039£-CA 
Priority 14(b) 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and 
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
oooOooo 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment dated April 17, 1990 A-2 
Scheller v. Dixie Six, 753 P.2d 971 
(Utah App. 1988) A-7 
Judgment dated June 18, 1985 A-13 
Certificate of Limited Partnership of 
D.S.T. Limited A-16 
Modification of Certificate of Limited Partnership . . A-23 
DATED: May 10, 1991. 
u\W— 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. (A1026) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Telephone: 486-5634 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and
 t 
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, \ 
Defendant. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 830906862CV 
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
This matter came on for trial on the 21st day of November, 
1989, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The plaintiffs, Scheller 
and Tollstrup, were represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr. and 
Richard M. Matheson. Dixie Six was represented by Craig G. 
Adamson and John T. Evans. i 
This matter was remanded to this court by the Utah Court of 
Appeals for the sole purpose of determining the value of the non-
sale efforts of Dixie Six, the general partner, to Scheller and 
Tollstrup, the limited partners, under a theory of quantum meruit 
outlined by the Court of Appeals in its decision. The court 
having reviewed the file, the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
the evidence submitted and the argument advanced by each of the 
parties at the trial after remand and being fully informed in the 
matter, and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters 
the following: 
A-2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Dixie Six and Scheller and TollstrUP presented 
evidence as to the value of the uotv-sale efforts, of Dixie Siv:^  
2. Scheller and Tollstrup's experts testified that the 
efforts of Dixie Six did not enhance the value of the property, 
since the purchaser, Busch Development Company# modified the 
plans and obtained a new conditional use permit and did not 
utilize the efforts made by Dixie Six. One of scheller and 
Tollstrup's experts testified that reasonable effort to obtain a 
conditional use permit at the time in question would have 
required 40 hours of time at $75 per hour. 
2. Dixie Six presented evidence through it£ general manager 
that he spent 10% to 20% of his time over a two and one half year 
period on the project in question. Dixie Six presented no 
evidence as to the hourly value of such time* 
3. The court finds that the manager of Dixie Six spent 15% 
of his time during the two and one-half years from 1980 through 
1982 in non-sale efforts and that such efforts have a reasonable 
value of $36,000.00. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact# th£ court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court of Appeals remanded to this court the sole 
question whether Dixie Six was entitled to any compensation in 
quantum meruit for the value# if any, of its non-^sale efforts. 
2. Accordingly, the court concludes that the reasonable 
2 
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value of Dixie Six/s non-sale efforts in quantum meruit is 
$36,000.00 and determines that Dixie Six should be awarded that 
amount and that Scheller and Tollstrup should receive the balance 
of the sale proceeds plus interest thereon in accordance with the 
Court of Appeals decision. 
DATED this day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
LEONARD H. RUSSON, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2 ^ day of March, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered 
to Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee, attorneys for defendant, 
310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, UT. 
L ' sy< 
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Telephone: 486-5634 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and 
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 830906862CV 
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
This matter came on for trial on the 21st day of November, 
1989, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The plaintiffs were 
represented by Walter P. Faber, Jr. and Richard M. Matheson. 
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson and John T. Evans. 
This matter was remanded to this court by the Utah Court of 
Appeals for the sole purpose of determining the value of the non-
sale efforts of the defendant, Dixie Six, the general partner, to 
the plaintiffs, Scheller and Tollstrup, the limited partners, 
under a theory of quantum meruit outlined by the Court of Appeals 
n its decision. The court having reviewed the file, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, the evidence submitted and the 
argument advanced by each of the parties at the trial after 
remand and having entered its findings and conclusions of law and 
being fully informed in the matter, and good cause appearing 
therefor, it is hereby 
A-5 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
Dixie Six be awarded the sum of $36,000,00 for its non-sale 
efforts and that Scheller and Tollstrup receive the balance of 
the sale proceeds plus interest thereon in accordance with the 
Court of Appeals decision. 
en c&4U. 
DATED this / / day of 45arch, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
fismmd H. RUSSON. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the_£?T_May of March, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered 
to Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee, attorneys for defendant, 
310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, UT. 
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SCHELLER v. DIXIE SIX CORP. 
Cite as 753 P-2d 971 (UtahApp. 1988) 
Utah 971 
gom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505. "[I]t cannot 
be adopted as a general precept of contract 
law that, whenever one party to a contract 
can show injury flowing from the exercise 
of a contract right by the other, a basis for 
relief will be somehow devised by the 
courts." Mann, 586 P.2d at 464. 
The judgment below is reversed. The 
parties shall bear their own costs on ap-
peal. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., 
concur. 
( O |«YNUMMI5YST£M> 
Vivian M. SCHELLER and Steven D. 
Tollstrup, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860147-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 25, 1988. 
Limited partners in real estate limited 
partnership filed suit seeking declaratory 
judgment limiting general partner to recov-
ery of its expenses plus 6% sales commis-
sion for sale of undeveloped partnership 
property. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., conclud-
ed that limited partners were estopped 
from claiming that general partner had not 
performed in accordance with partnership 
agreement, and limited partners appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) limited partners were not estopped by 
their actions from asserting that general 
partner did not perform as provided under 
agreement; (2) "develop" within meaning 
of partnership agreement meant build, and 
agreement did not contemplate sale of 
property without development; and (3) par-
ties' conduct established contract implied in 
fact as to allocation of proceeds if property 
was sold prior to development, and general 
partner was entitled to recovery in quan-
tum meruit for reasonable value of its non-
sale efforts. 
Affirmed in 
manded in part. 
part, reversed and re-
1. Partnership e»366 
Limited partners in real estate limited 
partnership, who contended that general 
partner's right to share equally in profits 
from sale of property was only triggered if 
the property was developed, were not es-
topped from contesting general partner's 
entitlement to profits upon sale of undevel-
oped property by virtue of their previous 
agreement to two minor sales of undevel-
oped property and to proposed sale which 
never took place. 
2. Partnership <3=»366 
"Develop," within meaning of real es-
tate limited partnership agreement that 
provided that purpose of partnership was 
to develop property, meant build, and divi-
sion of profits upon sale of property before 
any building had taken place could not be 
determined by reference to agreement. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Partnership e»366 
Conduct of parties to real estate limit-
ed partnership agreement that provided 
that purpose of partnership was to develop 
property established contract implied in 
fact as to allocation of proceeds if property 
was sold prior to development, and general 
partner was entitled to recovery in quan-
tum meruit for reasonable value of its non-
sale efforts; limited partners requested 
general partner to perform work of devel-
oping property and general partner clearly 
expected to be compensated for such ser-
vices, and limited partners knew or should 
have known that general partner expected 
compensation beyond sales commission it 
would receive for just selling property. 
A-7 
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Walter P. Faber, Jr., Watkins & Faber, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
Craig G. Adamson (argued), Mark A. 
Larsen, Lawrence K. Hurless, Dart, Adam-
son, and Parken, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellants Scheller and Tollstrup appeal 
from a judgment awarding defendant Dixie 
Six Corporation what they contend is an 
excessive distribution pursuant to a limited 
partnership agreement between the par-
ties. We reverse in part and remand. 
Facts 
Vivian Scheller and her son Steven 
Tollstrup ("Scheller"), owned approximate-
ly twenty-four acres of property in Salt 
Lake County which they intended to have 
developed to produce long-term income. In 
the spring of 1979, Mrs. Scheller ap-
proached Hal Larsen, an officer of Dixie 
Six Corporation, about working with her 
and her son to develop the property. On 
March 3, 1980, the parties formed a limited 
partnership known as D.S.T., Ltd., with 
Dixie Six as the general partner and Mrs. 
Scheller and her son as limited partners. 
Pursuant to the limited partnership agree-
ment, Dixie Six contributed $10,000 toward 
the initial capital and Scheller conveyed the 
property to D.S.T. 
The partnership agreement provided that 
the purpose of the partnership was to "sub-
divide, develop and market" the property. 
The words "subdivide, develop and market" 
were left undefined. The agreement con-
tained a formula for the allocation of the 
partnership's receipts, which may be sum-
marized as follows: 
(a) First, to reimburse the actual ex-
penses relative to the subdividing, de-
1. Articles IV and XIV of the agreement required 
Dixie Six, as one of its obligations, to obtain 
velopment, improvement and sale of 
the property, 
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited 
Partners for the real property, calcu-
lated at $30,000 per acre. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to 
Dixie Six and one-half of the remain-
der to the Limited Partners. 
In addition, the agreement provided that 
Dixie Six could charge the partnership a 
real estate commission not exceeding 6% of 
the sales price of the property and, further, 
that Dixie Six had the unqualified right to 
sell the property at any time. 
Following the signing of the agreement, 
Dixie Six hired Western Design, which be-
gan preparing plans, plats, and studies, and 
sought governmental approval to build an 
apartment and commercial complex on the 
site. 
In April 1981, D.S.T. sold 1.2 acres of the 
property to Marvin Hendrickson, an officer 
and shareholder in Dixie Six, for $36,000.00 
and in February 1982, D.S.T. sold an addi-
tional 0.75 acres to Hendrickson. In both 
transactions, D.S.T. took no sales commis-
sion or other distribution and paid all of the 
proceeds to Scheller. 
Once the plans for improvement on the 
site were completed in the fall of 1982, 
Dixie Six attempted to get financing for 
the project but was unsuccessful.1 During 
this time, D.S.T. received an offer from 
P.F. West to purchase the remaining prop 
erty. Dixie Six sought Scheller's consent 
to the proposed sale to P.F. Wesi and 
Scheller consented, but the sale was never 
completed. Dixie Six subsequently discon-
tinued its efforts to locate and obtain fi-
nancing. Dixie Six then caused the remain-
ing partnership property to be sold to 
Busch Development on June 30, 1983. for a 
sum in excess of $1.2 million. 
Prior to the sale of the property. Dixie 
Six informed Scheller that it intended to 
divide the proceeds from the sale according 
to the formula set forth in the partnership 
financing. 
,-8 
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Cite at 753 P2d S 
agreement2 Scheller objected to allocation 
of the proceeds on that basis. The sale 
was concluded without the allocation issue 
having been resolved. On September 23, 
1983 Scheller filed suit in district court 
seeking a declaratory judgment limiting 
Dixie Six to the recovery of its expenses 
plus the 6% sales commission for the sale 
of the property and to prohibit Dixie Six 
from sharing in the profit of the sale as set 
forth in the partnership agreement. 
The trial court found that the partner-
ship agreement did not define the words 
"subdivide, develop, and market" and con-
cluded that Dixie Six did not violate the 
agreement by selling the property. The 
court also concluded that Scheller was es-
topped from claiming that Dixie Six had 
not performed in accordance with the con-
tract because Scheller had knowledge of, 
and in fact acquiesced and approved of, all 
sales of the property. In addition, the 
court found that it would be inequitable to 
allow Scheller to accept the efforts of Dixie 
Six without allowing Dixie Six to recover as 
provided in the contract. Since the parties 
had expressly provided no alternative meth-
od of compensating Dixie Six for its servic-
es, the court found the formula as set forth 
in the partnership agreement to be enforce-
able. 
Scheller argues that Dixie Six was not 
entitled to a full share of the profits from 
the sale of the property because it sold the 
property without "developing" it as re-
quired by the agreement. Scheller ac-
knowledges that, while Dixie Six had the 
unqualified right to sell the property at any 
time, a right Scheller contends was given 
primarily for tax purposes, it had the obli-
gation to "subdivide, develop and market" 
the property. Thus, Dixie Six's right to 
share in the proceeds according to the for-
mula set forth in the agreement was con-
tingent upon its fulfilling its obligation to 
"subdivide, develop and market" the prop-
erty. 
The trial court did not reach the issue of 
the meaning of the term "develop" as used 
2. In their complaint, Scheller also claimed that 
Dixie Six had demanded a commission of 19% 
XIE SIX CORP. Utah 973 
(UtahApp. 1988) 
in the agreement because it determined 
that Scheller was "estopped" from taking 
the position that Dixie Six had not per-
formed as provided in the contract. We 
find Scheller's conduct does not constitute 
estoppel. 
Estoppel 
[1] The elements of estoppel are: "con-
duct by one party which leads another par-
ty, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in detriment or damage if 
the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct" Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 
1230, (Utah CtApp. 1988) (quoting Black-
hurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 
688, 691 (Utah 1985)). The trial court con-
cluded that appellants were estopped from 
asserting that Dixie Six could not sell the 
property unless it was "developed" because 
Scheller had knowledge of, acquiesced in, 
and approved of the two minor sales of 
property to Marvin Hendrickson and the 
proposed sale to P.F. West, all without any 
development having taken place. However, 
the trial court's conclusion confuses Schel-
ler's position concerning sale of the proper-
ty with Scheller's position concerning the 
allocation of proceeds upon sale. 
Scheller has not asserted that Dixie Six 
could not sell the property unless it was 
"developed" as anticipated under the 
agreement but only that Dixie Six was not 
entitled to a full share of the proceeds for 
the sale of property unless it satisfied its 
obligations under the contract Scheller's 
approval of the first two sales of property 
do not constitute an estoppel from object-
ing to the allocation of proceeds from the 
Busch sale for two reasons. First the 
earlier sales of property, combined, consti-
tuted only 1.95 acres out of the total 24 
acres owned by D.S.T. and involved land 
that was never intended for development 
Second, Dixie Six took no sales commis-
sions on these transactions and paid all the 
proceeds to Scheller. Therefore, Scheller 
rather than the 6% provided in the agreement. 
A-9 
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had no reason to complain about the alloca-
tion of proceeds. 
Nor can Scheller's approval of the pro-
posed P.F. West sale form the basis of an 
estoppel from objecting to the allocation of 
proceeds from the Busch sale. The P.F. 
West sale was never completed and there 
were no proceeds to allocate. Thus, Schel-
ler's failure to object to the allocation of 
proceeds from two sales in which Dixie Six 
took no proceeds and one proposed sale 
which never reached the point of allocation, 
is not conduct that could reasonably lead 
Dixie Six to believe that Scheller would not 
object to its claiming a full share of pro-
ceeds in the event of a consummated sale 
of undeveloped property. Any uncertainty 
in this regard was resolved when, nearly 
two months prior to closing of the Busch 
sale, Scheller's counsel wrote Dixie Six ob-
jecting to use of the agreement's formula 
for allocating sale proceeds if the property 
were sold undeveloped. 
We hold that the trial court erred in 
concluding that Scheller was estopped by 
its own actions from asserting that Dixie 
Six did not perform as provided in the 
contract Because the trial court decided 
the case on a theory of estoppel, it was not 
necessary for it to reach what we view as 
the pivotal issue in this case, namely the 
meaning of the term "develop" as used in 
the agreement. Since we find that Schel-
ler's conduct did not give rise to an estop-
pel, the exact meaning of the term is crit-
ical. 
"Subdivide, Develop and Market" 
[2] Generally, the term "develop," 
when used in connection with real estate, is 
interpreted to mean "the converting of a 
tract of land into an area suitable for resi-
dential or business uses." Prince George's 
County v. Equitable Trust Co., Inc., 44 
Md.App. 272, 408 A.2d 737, 742 (1979). Ac-
cord, Muirkead v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 
258 So.2d 232, 233 (Miss.1972). Similarly, 
the word "developer," in common parlance, 
means "a person who develops real estate; 
3. Assuming that "develop" means "build/' uncer-
tainty remains as to what was to be built: a 
church, a race track, homes, a laundromat, or 
often: one that improves and subdivides 
land and builds and sells residential struc-
tures thereon." Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 618 (1986). 
The parties' agreement states in Article 
II that the purpose of the partnership is to 
"subdivide, develop, and market" the prop-
erty. The use of these terms, or some 
variation, throughout the agreement, is 
consistent with the interpretation that "de-
velop" means to build. For example, Arti-
cle VI, with our emphasis, states as fol-
lows: 
In addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute 
its expertise for the purpose of subdivid-
ing, developing and marketing the prop-
erty; shall provide or obtain all equip-
ment, machinery and personnel neces-
sary for such subdivision, development 
and marketing; and shall obtain the nec-
essary and sufficient financing for such 
subdivision, development and marketing, 
using the property as security thereof. 
Viewing the contract as a whole, we 
would have little difficulty in concluding, as 
a matter of law, that the term "develop" as 
used in this agreement means "build."3 
Equipment, machinery, and secured lend-
ing suggest construction, not die mere 
planning, surveying, studying, and apprais-
ing which Dixie Six contends satisfied the 
obligation to "develop" the property. 
However, even if there is some ambiguity 
concerning what the parties intended when 
using the term "develop," the evidence 
compels the conclusion that the parties in-
tended to mean "build." The formula allo-
cating a full 50% of the net proceeds to 
Dixie Six is itself indicative of that result. 
If all Scheller anticipated was the sale of 
the property, it would have hired a real 
estate agent and paid the standard real 
estate commission. Common sense dic-
tates that one does not offer soir.eone half 
of the net profit on the sale of property for 
simply serving as an agent to sell property-
More importantly, the prior discussions 
and negotiations between the parties and 
their course of conduct assumed actual 
even roadways, curbs, and gutters? Such uncc 
tainty is inconsequential in adjudicating il'*" Pa 
ties' rights where nothing whatever was bui 
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building on the property. The trial court 
found that Dixie Six sought government 
approval for "the building of an apartment 
and commercial complex on the site." The 
court also found that prior to forming the 
partnership, the parties met on the site of 
the property and "discussed possible types 
and configurations of buildings which 
might fit on the land." 
The parties' agreement contemplated the 
development of the property and did not 
anticipate the sale of the property undevel-
oped. Accordingly, the payment formula 
was premised on the sale of developed 
property. So certain were the parties that 
the property would be developed that they 
never contemplated a formula for the allo-
cation of proceeds in the event of a sale of 
undeveloped property. Thus, there was 
simply no agreement between the parties 
as to the allocation of proceeds in the event 
that Dixie Six failed to develop the proper-
ty as required by the agreement 
Absent a meeting of the minds on how to 
divide the proceeds in the event of sale 
without development, Dixie Six has no 
clear contractual right to recover anything 
in excess of the agreed commission and 
expense reimbursement. Nonetheless, 
Scheller concedes that Dixie Six may be 
entitled to some sort of equitable remedy. 
Quantum Meruit 
The trial court, considering it had no 
alternative method of compensation, deter-
mined it had to either award Dixie Six no 
additional compensation whatsoever or a 
full 50% of the profit from the sale of the 
property. It chose the latter rather than 
leave Dixie Six uncompensated for its ef-
forts. While we agree with the trial court 
that it would be unfair to allow Scheller to 
profit from the work done by Dixie Six in 
anticipation of development, we do not 
agree that the only alternative is to give 
Dixie Six a 50% share of the net proceeds 
from the sale. 
When a party, for some reason, is not 
entitled by the express terms of a contract 
to recover payment for services rendered, 
he or she might nonetheless be entitled to 
recover in quantum meruit. Davies v. 01-
XIE SIX CORP. Utah 975 
(UtahApp. 1988) 
son, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
Recovery under quantum meruit presup-
poses that no enforceable contract exists. 
Id. In this case, while the parties entered 
into a contract, no contract existed as to 
the allocation of proceeds in the event the 
property was sold undeveloped. 
Quantum meruit has two distinct branch-
es, both rooted in justice to prevent one 
party's enrichment at the other's expense. 
Id. at 269. The first branch, contract im-
plied in law or "quasi-contract," is really 
not a contract at all, but rather an action in 
restitution. Id. "The elements of a quasi-
contract, or a contract implied in law are: 
(1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defend-
ant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the defend-
ant to retain the benefit without paying for 
it." Id. Recovery under quasi-contract or 
contract implied in law is measured by the 
value of the benefit conferred on the de-
fendant and not by the detriment incurred 
by the plaintiff or, necessarily, the reason-
able value of the plaintiffs services. Id. 
The second branch of quantum meruit, 
contract implied in fact, is an actual con-
tract established by conduct. Id. The ele-
ments of a contract implied in fact are: (1) 
the defendant requested the plaintiff to 
perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expect-
ed the defendant to compensate him or her 
for those services; and (3) the defendant 
knew or should have known that the plain-
tiff expected compensation. Id. Recovery 
in such cases is for the amount the parties 
can be said to have reasonably intended as 
the contract price. When the parties have 
left that amount unexpressed, courts will 
infer the amount to be the reasonable value 
of the plaintiffs services. Id. 
[3] The conduct of the parties in this 
case established a contract implied in fact 
as to the allocation of proceeds if the prop-
erty was sold prior to development. Schel-
ler requested Dixie Six to perform the 
work of developing the property which nec-
essarily involved the work of preparing 
plans, plats, and studies and securing gov-
ernmental approval for construction on the 
site. Likewise, Dixie Six clearly expected 
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to be compensated for these services. Fi-
nally, Scheller knew or should have known 
that Dixie Six expected compensation for 
these services beyond the 6% sales commis-
sion it would receive for just selling the 
property. 
It is reasonably clear that, in agreeing to 
the payment formula prescribed in the 
agreement, the parties contemplated that 
Dixie Six's 6% commission, a standard com-
mission rate in the real estate industry, 
would compensate it for its efforts in mar-
keting the property while the 50% share in 
the net profits would reward it for its ef-
forts in subdividing and developing the 
property. Thus, if there had been a mere 
sale, 6% of the selling price would repre-
sent an appropriate allocation to Dixie Six. 
However, while it cannot be said that Dixie 
Six satisfied its obligation to develop the 
property, the trial court nonetheless found 
that Dixie Six had expended efforts which 
enhanced the property, including acquiring 
plans for development of the property and 
obtaining governmental approval for devel-
opment in accordance with the plans. As 
explained above, Dixie Six is entitled to a 
recovery in quantum meruit for the reason-
able value of its non-sale efforts. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in-
sofar as it awards Dixie Six the reimburse-
ment of its expenses and a sale commission 
of 6%. The judgment is reversed insofar 
as it also allowed Dixie Six 50% of the net 
sale profits, with remand for a determina-
tion of the amount of additional compensa-
tion to which Dixie Six is entitled under a 
theory of quantum meruit The parties 
shall bear their own costs of appeal. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Curtis OWENS, Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 870342-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 29,1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, George E. Ballif, J., of theft 
of rented property, but the court granted 
new trial. The State appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that State 
could not appeal order granting new trial. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Criminal Law <£»905 
Motion for new trial generally is per-
mitted for correcting errors made in trial 
court, or for reviewing conviction obtained 
by unfair or unlawful methods. 
2. Criminal Law <S=»919(1) 
Witness intimidation by prosecutor can 
warrant new trial if it resulted in denial of 
defendant's right to fair trial. U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-24(a). 
3. Criminal Law <s=»1024(7) 
In granting a new trial, trial court did 
not, in substance, grant arrest of judg-
ment, but looked beyond record to prosecu-
tor's and witness' affidavits and found im-
proper prosecutorial behavior warranting 
new trial, and State could not appeal from 
such order. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-26. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., David B. 
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for the State. 
Before JACKSON, BENCH and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
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Craig G« Adamson (0024) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, et al, 
J U D G M E N T 
P l a i n t i f f s , : 
vs. : 
Civil No. C83-6862 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, : Judge Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean 
E. Conder, a judge of the above-entitled court on the 10th day of 
May, 1985, and was concluded on the same day. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Walter P. Faber, their attorney of record. 
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson, its attorney of 
record. Trial proceeded and the parties each provided testimony, 
submitted documents and made argument to the court in support of 
their positions. Counsel for each of the parties has also 
submitted memoranda as requested by the court and the court has 
reviewed the memoranda and the file. The court being fully 
advised in the matter has issued its memorandum opinion and has 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
1 
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The court now being fully advised and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The limited partnership between the parties 
continues in force under its specific written terras. 
2. The defendant general partner is ordered to 
continue to collect and to distribute the funds from the sale of 
the property of the partnership as provided in Article IX of the 
agreement of the parties with the first monies applied to payment 
to general partner for sums due under paragraph 9.2 and 9.3 of 
the agreement of the parties. 
3. Plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment is 
denied. 
4. Defendant is awarded its costs herein. 
DATED this / 3 day of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dean? /e iy E. Conder 
District Judge 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1985, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, first-
class mail, postage prepaid, to Walter P. Faber, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs, at 2102 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109. 
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. 'J CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
if* 
OF 
D. S. T., LTD. 
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 
Dixie Six Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred 
to as "Dixie", VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, a woman, and STEVEN D. 
TOLLSTRUP, a man, hereinafter referred to collectively as "the 
Limited Partners", and individually by name, have formed a 
limited partnership and do hereby certify and state: 
ARTICLE I 
NAME 
The name of the limited partnership is D. S. T., LTD. 
ARTICLE II 
The purpose and character of the business of the 
partnership is to subdivide, develop and market certain real 
property located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
ARTICLE III 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
The principal office of the partnership shall be at 
4 39 4 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The partnership nay maintain such other offices and places of 
business as the partners from time to time find necessary or 
desirable, either within or without the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE IV 
NAMES AND RESIDENCE OF PARTNERS 
The names and residence addresses of each member of 
the partnership, general and limited partners being specifically 
designated, are as follows: 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION 4 39 4 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake C:ty, Utah 84107 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER 3778 East Cliff Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP 
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ARTICLE V 
TERM 
The term of the partnership shall begin as of the date 
of the execution of this Partnership Agreement, and shall continue 
until December 31, 1982, and thereafter from year to year unless 
terminated or dissolved as hereinafter provided. 
ARTICLE VI 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY PARTNERS 
The Limited Partners shall sell to the partnership 
the real property more fully described in Exhibit "A" annexed 
hereto and made a part hereof, which has an agreed value of ^Pft^i 
THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) per acre. Dixie shall con- ^ ^ 
tribute to the partnership the sum of $10,000, which sum shall be 
paid to the Limited Partners as a down payment on the property. 
In addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute its expertise for the 
purpose of subdividing, developing and marketing the property; 
shall provide or obtain all equipment, machinery and personnel 
necessary for such subdivision, development and marketing; and 
shall obtain the necessary and sufficient financing for such 
subdivision, development and marketing, using the property as 
security therefor. 
ARTICLE VII 
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Limited Partners shall not be obligated to make 
any additional contributions to the partnership. 
ARTICLE VIII 
RETURN OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
8.1. The Limited Partners shall be entitled to 
payment for the property upon termination of the 
partnership as provided in Article V or upon dissolution 
of the partnership as provided herein; provided, 
however, the Limited Partners shall not receive payment 
for the property until (a) all liabilities of the 
partnership, except liabilities to the General Partner 
and Limited Partners on account of their contributions, 
have been paid or there remains property of the partner-
ship sufficient to pay them; (b) the consent of all 
partners is had; and (c) the certificate is cancelled 
or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal or 
reduction. 
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8.2. Subject to the limitations of paragraph 8.1, 
the Limited Partners may rightfully demand payment for the 
property (a) on dissolution of the partnership, or (b) on 
the date specified in Article V for termination and 
dissolution of the partnership. 
ARTICLE IX 
PROFITS AND BOOKS 
9.1. The first accounting period for the partnership 
shall be from the date of execution of this Agreement to 
December 31, 1980. Thereafter, the profits and losses of 
the partnership shall be computed annually for each period 
January 1 through December 31. Profits and losses shall be 
allocated equally as specified hereinbelow. 
;> 9.2. Receipts of the partnership shall be allocated 
as follows: 
(a) First, to the actual expenses of the 
partnership or Dixie relative to the subdividing, 
development, improvement and sale of the property, 
such expenses to be itemized on a monthly statement 
provided to the Limited Partners. 
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited Partners 
for the real property. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to Dixie 
and one-half of the r~emalndeV to the Lfmited Partners. 
9.3. In calculating the actual expenses of the part-
nership or Dixie relative to the subdividing, development, 
improvement and sale of the property pursuant to paragraph 
9.2(a) hereinabove, Dixie shall not apply any fixed cost or 
overhead expenses to the partnership project. Dixie or any 
of its affiliates or principals may charge__the partnership 
a real estate^Hr"o^r"aqe commissi on jot exceeding" JSI'X" pefce n t 
(6%) "or the sales price of the property or any portion 
thereof. 
9.4. No salary shall be paid to any Partners. There 
will be established an individual drawing account to be 
maintained for each Partner, which shall be charged with all 
withdrawals made for such Partner's benefit. No drawing 
account shall be established for the General Partner unless 
and until all actual expenses of development and improvement 
have been paid and the Limited Partners have received 
payment for the real property. 
9.5. An individual capital account shall be maintained 
for each Partner and shall be credited with all contrib-
utions made by that Partner and charged and credited in 
accordance with this paragraph and with paragraphs 9.1, 9.6 
and 9.7 herein. 
9.6. As soon as practicable after the close of each 
calendar year, but in no event later than three and one-half 
(3-1/2) months after the close of the calendar year, the 
drawing accounts of the Partners shall be closed to the 
capital accounts. 
9.7. After payment of ail debts and expenses of the 
partnership, the net cash flow of the partnership may be 
distributed to the Partners annually or more frequently, 
as determined by the General and Limited Partners. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, net cash flow shall be deemed 
to mean net cash remaining in the partnership's account after 
A-18 
-4-
payment of ail legitimate partnership expenses and with-
holding a reasonable reserve for contingencies. Such cash 
flow shall be computed without regard to profits or 
losses shown on the partnership's books, except as such 
profits or losses may affect the reserve for contingencies. 
Any such distributions shall be charged against the 
Partners' drawing accounts. 
9.8. The books of the partnership shall be maintained 
at the principal office of the partnership and shall be 
open to reasonable inspection by any partner. Such books 
shall be kept on such accounting basis as the partnership 
nay determine from time to time. 
ARTICLE X 
ADDITIONAL LIMITED PARTNERS 
No addirional limited partners shall be admitted to 
the partnership without the unanimous consent of all partners, 
both general and limited. _^^ -/: < (2 ^ L'V/3 
ARTICLE XII w/.'A ^ 
PRIORITY OF LIMITED PARTNERS B S ^Wr 
L'o Li! ited Partner shall have priority over any other 
Limited Partner either as to contributions to capita.1 or by way 
of income. 
ARTICLE XIII 
DEMAND OF PROPERTY IN RETURN FOR CONTRIBUTION 
Upon termination of the partnership, no general or 
limited partner shall have the right to demand and receive prop-
erty other than cash in return for its contribution. Upon con-
currence of all the partners, both general and limited, other 
than the partner demanding return of his contribution, the 
withdrawing partner may have his contribution returned in property 
other than cash. 
ARTICLE XIV 
CONDUCT OF PARTNERSHIP 
On the date hereof, the Limited Partners shall convey 
the property described in Exhibit "A" to the partnership by 
Warranty Deed. The Limited Partners shall cause such property to 
be graded to mee_ Salt Lake County standards, and shall cause all 
buildings and personal property located on such property to be 
removed r.herefror1. It is understood by the parties that the 
property shall be utilized by the partnership to obtain a loan, 
the pioceeds thereof to be used for the subdivision, development 
and marketing of t.he property by Dixie. 
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ARTICLE XV 
MANAGEMENT 
15.1. Subject to the provisions stated in this 
Article, Dixie shall exercise complete control in the 
management of the partnership and shall devote such time 
zo the partnership as shall be reasonably required for 
its welfare and success. Dixie shall obtain the necessary 
financing for the subdivision, development and marketing 
of the property. ^Dixie shall proceed with subdividing, 
developing and marketing the property as expeditiously 
as possible. Dixie shall do no act detrimental to the 
best interests of the partnership. 
15.2. No Limited Partner shall participate in the 
management of the partnership business. 
15.3. The Limited Partners hereby consent to any sale 
or other disposition, encumbrance, mortgage or lease by 
Dixie on behalf of the partnership, of any or all of the 
partnership assets, now or hereafter acquired, on such terms 
and conditions as may be determined by Dixie, and to the 
employment, when and if required, of such brokers, agents 
and attorneys as Dixie may determine, notwithstanding that 
any party hereto may have an interest therein; provided, 
however, in the event Dixie proposes to sell the property to 
any entity controlled by Dixie or in which Dixie or any of 
its principals own an interest, the sale price for the 
property shall be determined as follows: 
Dixie shall appoint an appraiser, the Limited 
Partners shall appoint an appraiser, and the two 
appraisers thus appointed shall appoint a third 
appraiser. The three appraisers thus determined 
shall thereupon appraise the partnership property. 
An appraisal agreed to by at least two of the 
three appraisers shall be controlling. 
ARTICLE XVI 
DEPOSITS 
All funds of the partnership shall be deposited in its 
name in such checking account or accounts designated by Dixie. 
All withdrawals therefrom shall be made upon checks signed by the 
authorized officers of Dixie. 
ARTICLE XVII 
CONVEYANCES 
Any deed, bill of sale, mortgage, lease, contract of 
sale or other document purporting to convey or encumber the inter-
est of the partnership in all or any portion of any real or personal 
property at any time held in its name, may be signed by Dixie. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP 
The partnership shall be dissolved upon the occurrence 
of any of the following events: 
(a) The sale of all property to third parties. 
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(b) The bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership or 
involuntary dissolution of Dixie. 
(c) Upon written notice by the Limited Partners, if 
Dixie shall fail to perform its obligations hereunder and 
such failure shall continue for a period of thirty (30) 
days after receipt of such written notice. 
In the event of a dissolution as provided hereinabove, 
the partnership shall immediately begin to wind up its affairs. 
The proceeds front liquidation of partnership assets, after payment 
to all creditors of the partnership in the order of priority 
provided by law, shall be paid and applied in accordance with 
Article IX hereinabove. 
ARTICLE XIX 
GOVERNING LAW 
This agreement and the rights of the parties hereunder 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the ]aws in the State of 
Utah. 
ARTICLE XX 
LIMITED LIABILITY 
The liability of the Limited Partners shall be limited 
to contributions made to the partnership. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto 
set their hands this 3 day of / V /4-/g <L H 1980. 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION 
ATTEST: 
/ 
>'/ - '"" / A ' ' ' ',<* / By ~""^ T QJP^VU^^^^I 
President 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
z_ 
Vivian fl. Scheller 
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ST/\TE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 3rd day of N a r c h , 1980, personally 
appeared before re E. Verne lireeze , who being by me duly 
sworn, did say that he is the President of Dixie Six Corporation, 
and that the foregoing Certificate of Limited Partnership was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution 
of its Board of Directors and said E. Verne freeze 
acknowledged to r.e that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary PuBlic 
R e s i d i n g a t : Salt Lake City 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
1L July 1^3 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the *rd day of ^arch , 1980, personally 
appeared before ir.e VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP, 
who being by me first duly sworn acknowledged to me that they 
executed the forecroing Certificate of Limited Partnership as 
limited partners. 
Notary Public 
R e s i d i n g a t : Sal t Lake City 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 
1C J-2 \ l\lt 
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MODIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
D.S.T., LTD. 
This modification of the Certificate of Limited 
Partnership of D.S.T., LTD., made and entered into this 
3d _day of A^QjUa/ukJ • 198^_f by, between and among 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, VIVIAN M. SCHELLER and STEVEN D. 
TOLLSTRUP, being all of the partners. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, a question as to the termination date 
of the partnership exists and the partners have entered into 
a verbal agreement to modify the portion of the agreement 
concerning termination which they wish to formalize, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants 
and agreements hereinafter contained it is agreed as follows: 
1. The Certificate of Limited Partnership is modi-
fied as follows: 
ARTICLE V 
TERM 
The term of the partnership shall continue 
until June 30, 1983, unless otherwise extended 
by tho parties hereto. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION 
BY ' -• , S -^\/- ^ 
Attest: President 
• / 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER 
y 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Walter P. Faber, Jr. 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
